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Abstract
Raftery et al (1997) criticise Seymour & Rooke (1995) for setting out battle lines in their use of the 
terms rationalist and interpretive paradigms and argue that such dichotomies lead to a degeneration 
in research standards.   Sharing their concern for research standards, in reply, we argue that Raftery 
et al’s  plea  for  methodological  liberalism will  itself  undermine  standards.    Different  research 
methods are required for different research purposes and are to be evaluated according to different 
criteria.   These criteria must be made explicit.   We state our own research purposes and make an 
initial attempt to set out some criteria against which we would wish our own research to be judged.
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It is gratifying that our recent essay on research paradigms (Seymour & Rooke 1995) has drawn 
such a trenchant response (Raftery, McGeorge & Walters 1997).   It would be churlish of us to 
complain, after writing an article of critical intent, that the response to it should concentrate on the 
weakest part of our argument.   It is unfortunate, however, that in attacking our use of the term 
‘paradigm’ in the presentation of our critique, Raftery et al direct the focus of debate away from 
where we feel  it  should lie,  with  the choice between  verstehen  and causal  explanations.    We 
perceive  three  strands  to  their  criticism of  our  distinction  between  rationalist  and  interpretive1 
paradigms:  first, that it constitutes the drawing up of battle lines and that the debate may generate 
more heat than light;  second, that it is not possible to categorise studies according to the rationalist/
interpretive dichotomy;  lastly, that methodological critiques such as ours can lead to a degeneration 
in standards of research.   We will deal with each of these points in turn and then attempt to further 
explain our position.
First,  the  dangers  of  promoting  unnecessary  confrontation  and  acrimony  within  the  research 
community.   Raftery et al are right to point these out and we apologise unreservedly if our paper 
has  given offence to  anyone.    This  was  not  our intention.    Unfortunately,  their  metaphor  of 
military conflict does less to defuse any such feelings than to encourage them.   We stress that our 
paper was not intended as an attack, but as constructive criticism.   There was certainly no intention 
to ‘demonise’ anybody.
Instead of the battle metaphor we would like to suggest another, provided by Anderson, Hughes and 
Sharrock (1986).   Following Rorty (1980), they liken philosophy to a conversation.   Unlike a 
battle,  a  conversation  is  not  a  zero  sum  game;  there  are  no  winners  or  losers  -  instead,  all 
participants stand to gain.
“Each contribution has  something to  offer  and something distinctive  worth hearing. 
After all, a conversation is not a monologue, nor is it a ritual chant.”  (Anderson et al 
1986:269)
Raftery et al have been very generous in thanking us for stimulating a debate, it is this 
generosity we would prefer to remember, rather than their image of young researchers 
doing each other to death like mythical warriors.
Secondly,  they highlight  the  crudity  of  the  interpretive/rationalist  dichotomy,  demonstrating  its 
inappropriateness in categorising studies.   They are quite correct in this.   That the dichotomy 
should be used for such a purpose was never intended by us:  it  should be regarded only as a 
simplifying, explanatory device.   Its purpose was to draw attention to some problems with current 
construction  management  research.    Our  use  of  the  term  paradigm owes  much  to  the  usage 
developed by Kuhn (1970), though it should be borne in mind that Kuhn himself doubted the strict 
applicability of the term to social studies.   It would be more correct to see the two paradigms as 
different ways of thinking.   Many papers will contain elements of each;  this, indeed, is a serious 
1 The term 'interpretive' follows the American writers who have been a profound influence on our thinking.   The 
rather unwieldy spelling ‘interpretative’ in our original paper was adopted on the prompting of a referee.   Now, 
with the appearance of a third, Australasian usage - ‘interpretist’, we have given up trying to please everyone and 
return to our original preference.
problem in itself, as we will endeavour to explain below.   Furthermore, each paradigm does not 
contain a single method, but several.   For instance, within the interpretive paradigm there are those 
who set out to produce fundamental criticisms of the status quo and those, like ourselves, who seek 
to maintain a principled indifference to it - these diverse outlooks clearly require different methods 
of analysis for their fulfilment.   It is to be hoped that some advocate of the former approach will, at 
some future date, outline this alternative position in these pages.   
The dichotomy can be applied as a kind of standard against which studies are judged, such that they 
can be described as interpretive in this respect, rationalist in that, but even this is not our present 
intention.   We would much prefer to focus on the real difficulties we see confronting construction 
management research, which we attempted to call attention to in our paper, but which Raftery et al 
unfortunately do not address.   
Finally, the quote from Halsey (1996) highlights the dangers of sacrificing academic rigour.   Loss 
of academic standards is indeed a grave danger and we stress most strongly that our intentions are 
exactly the opposite - to promote academic rigour, rather than to undermine it.   We attempted to do 
this by criticising what we see as problems with current standards, which we labelled the rationalist 
paradigm.   We are somewhat taken aback by Raftery et al’s accusation that we did not sufficiently 
define the term rationalist.   In a section headed ‘The Dominant Rationalist Paradigm’ (Seymour & 
Rooke 1995:512-514),  we spent almost two pages explaining what we meant by it.    Surely it 
should  be  apparent  from any reading  of  this  passage  that  our  intention  is  not  to  attack  'sane, 
judicious or reasonable' research, as Raftery et al charge;  this would be nonsense.   Others use the 
term ‘positivist’ as a synonym for ‘rationalist’ (Runeson 1997; Root, Fellows & Hancock 1997); 
within the context of this debate, we find such a usage acceptable.
The  multi-paradigm  approach  which  Raftery  et  al  advocate  is  not  conducive  to  the  aim  of 
developing greater rigour.   On the contrary, we would attribute the problems suffered in sociology 
to the prevalence of precisely this kind of do-as-you-please, methodological liberalism.   For the 
unintended effect of advocating a multi-paradigm approach is to license all kinds of unexamined 
premises,  methods  and  arguments.    Such  an  approach  merely  avoids  argument,  in  fact,  by 
removing the need for agreement.   Take for example Csete and Albrecht (1994), whom they quote 
with approval
“both  paradigms  ascribe  to  the  same  basic  goal  of  research,  to  gain  a  better 
understanding of the world.”
But what constitutes a better understanding of the world?   This is precisely what is at 
issue.   It is our central contention that verstehen understandings rather than causal ones 
should be the aim of social research and that management studies is primarily a social 
discipline.    In  the  final  analysis,  the  two  goals  are  incompatible,  since  the  latter 
involves  giving  precedence  to  the  views  of  the  researcher/theorist  and  the  former 
involves giving precedence to the views of those who are subjects of the research.   As 
Wagner (1981:16) has pointed out, in the context of anthropological research
“every anthropological undertaking stands at a cross-roads:  it can choose between an 
open-ended  experience  of  mutual  creativity  […]  and  a  forcing  of  our  own 
preconceptions onto other peoples.”
Wagner is not saying here that causal understandings are not viable.   Nor is he denying 
that, in the course of our ordinary common sense reasoning, we combine causal and 
verstehen understandings to great practical effect.   What he is pointing out is that if we 
are to engage in the rigorous pursuit of verstehen understanding, then we must restrain 
our natural propensity to give precedence to our own beliefs and opinions, over those of 
the subjects of our research.   This restriction includes any causal understandings we 
may favour.
Of course we are not saying that researchers’ opinions may not be valid.   But surely academic 
rigour demands that we do not settle for mere opinion?   Clearly Raftery et al do not understand this 
point.   Indeed, they acknowledge as much
“We were puzzled to discover that according to Seymour and Rooke, attempting to find 
causal variables is ‘inimical’ to the ‘special demands’ of social research.”
They  are  so  puzzled  that  they  pass  over  it  without  further  comment.    Yet  the 
problematic nature of causal analyses of social processes is crucial to our argument. 
This is because the kind of understanding, and therefore the kind of enquiry, which is 
best suited to the study of people is not causal, but conceptual (Ryle 1963;  Blumer 
1967;  Coulter 1979;  Winch 1990;  Button, Coulter, Lee & Sharrock 1995).   The 
required  analysis  is  an  analysis  of  meaning,  rather  than  analysis  of  causality. 
Approaches  such  as  Csete  and  Albrecht’s  obscure  such  questions  with  anodyne 
platitudes such as ‘we are all striving for the truth’.   Of course, we would  not wish to 
deny this, but such platitudes raise the discussion to a level of abstraction where the real 
problems we attempted to highlight become totally obscured.
All this raises the further question of how far our criticism of current practice extends.   Are we in 
fact asserting that all research in construction management is social research?   We are not in a 
position to give a precise answer to this question.   However, we would point out that construction 
processes are carried out by people engaging in concerted social action.   Recent research into the 
achievement  of  concrete  cover  (Shammas-Toma,  Seymour  & Clark  1996,  Seymour,  Shammas-
Toma & Clark 1997) demonstrates that our approach bears upon what are often regarded as purely 
technical matters, more closely than many might assume.
We are left to wonder what precisely Raftery et al are advocating?   They recognise that a paradigm 
is a ‘conceptual framework or a “world view”’, yet they seem to require researchers and analysts to 
work within two (or more?) of these at the same time.   They do not acknowledge the immense, 
perhaps insurmountable, difficulty of such a task.   Indeed, elsewhere in their note they treat the 
whole question of paradigms as if it were merely a question of preferring one method over another. 
Choice of  methods is itself an important topic, dealt with in Crook (1997) but such differences do 
not in themselves constitute paradigm shifts.   Confusion over the use of such terms as ‘paradigm’, 
‘method’ and ‘methodology’ are rife at present and those seeking clarification could do worse than 
consult two recent publications in our own field, Edum-Fotwe, Price & Thorpe (1996) and Root et 
al (1997).   Though we do not endorse the conclusions of either paper and, in particular, would 
warn against Edum-Fotwe  et al’s over-reliance on Haralambos & Holborn (1991), we do at least 
find a greater clarity here on the distinction between method and paradigm.   
Let  us  now attempt  to  clarify the issues  as  we see them.   First,  we see the paradigmatic,  or 
methodological issue as being the question of what kind of understanding researchers and analysts 
should be trying to achieve.   We do not rule out any methods a priori; it is the significance of the 
findings that these methods achieve which is at issue.   Researchers and analysts must take a view 
on  this.    Not  to  do  so  leads  to  ontological  relativism and  the  chaotic  conflict  which  Halsey 
bemoans.   For, once an insistence on rigorous academic standards is abandoned, the field is left 
open to unreasoned passion and empty rhetoric.   We have criticised current standards, to be sure, 
but we will never consent to all standards being abandoned.   The multi-paradigm approach, we 
fear, may be the first step on such a path, for it allows the possibility of evading definable standards 
by appealing to ever more abstract notions.
Part of what we object to in current practice is that it allows bad researchers to get away with a 
mechanistic application of formal procedure, because adherence to such procedures is assumed to 
confer ‘objectivity’ on their findings.   Runeson (1997) equates the interpretive researcher with the 
perceptive researcher.   We would not demur from this.   Where we differ from Runeson is in our 
unwillingness to leave the matter of the researcher’s perceptiveness to chance.   On the contrary, 
such perceptiveness is the primary necessity for a management researcher and research that lacks 
this quality is not only bad research, it  is unacceptable research.   Our approach is intended to 
develop and exploit the researcher’s perceptiveness.
What is acceptable?   Though there has been much work in various social studies disciplines, to 
establish realistic criteria for successful research, we cannot claim to have identified a lucid model 
for management researchers to follow.   We are still developing our approach and will continue to 
do so in  the context  of  our  ongoing conversation with the research community at  large.    We 
attempted to give some indication of the direction we have taken in our original paper, we will 
attempt to elucidate further in a future response to Runeson’s (1997) staunch defence of positivism. 
Meanwhile, we will conclude by attempting to outline some methodological principles which we 
attempt to follow, in order to achieve the verstehen understanding we have called for.   First, the 
explication of inter-subjectively established meaning is the aim of social research.   Second, such 
explication requires the researcher to refrain from constructing theoretical explanations (including 
causal ones), since these impose the researcher’s meanings at the expense of those of the subjects of 
the  research.    Third,  therefore,  the  final  test  of  the  validity  of  an  analysis  is  if  it  can  be 
demonstrated that such an analysis is the analysis which is used by the subjects of the analysis in 
analysing their own situation.   Fourth, there is a tension between these academic principles and the 
further principle that the findings of research should be useful to practitioners, in the sense that 
fulfilling the first cannot guarantee the second, and vice versa.   Fifth, this tension can be managed 
on the basis that all findings are produced in specific circumstances, for specific purposes.   Sixth, 
the research should be capable of communicating a knowledge of how others in the construction 
process see that process in a way that is useful to practitioners (that usefulness to be judged by the 
practitioners themselves).   Seventh, in addition, research should enable practitioners to reflect upon 
their own practices in such a way as to facilitate their attempts to improve those practices.
We take it that research conducted in conformance to these principles is, if not non-existent, at least 
rare in construction management at the present time.
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